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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 25 and with leave of this Court, the
Utah Taxpayers Association ("UTA"), by and through counsel of record, hereby files this

amicus curiae brief in the above-captioned matter. The Utah State Tax Commission (the
"Commission"), through this appeal, claims unprecedented and unfettered authority to
increase a related corporate taxpayer's income tax liability by denying lawful deductions
for expenses paid to related entities on the sole basis that the deductions reduce tax
liability. This Court should reject that position and uphold the district court's decision,
which applies the long-standing and reasonable principles of Utah Code section 59-7-113
("Section 113 '') to put transactions between related taxpayers on tax parity to those with
unrelated taxpayers.
The UTA is a statewide organization representing a broad array of taxpayers
throughout Utah. It represents many taxpayers and investors potentially affected by this
case and the Commission's claim of unfettered discretion. The purpose of the UTA is to
promote efficient, economical government and fair and equitable taxation in Utah,
including the furtherance and stimulation of the economy. The UTA submits this amicus
brief to explain the far-reaching negative impact a reversal of the district court's ruling
would have upon Utah taxpayers, potential investments in Utah, and on Utah's business
climate in general.
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BACKGROUND
Appellee See's Candies, Inc. ("See's") deducted royalty fees paid to a related
company for the use of intellectual property in calculating its taxable income for
corporate franchise tax purposes. 1 The district court held that See's was entitled to
deduct the royalty fees under Utah law, and that See's income was clearly reflected under
Section 113 after applying a small adjustment. District Court Decision at pp. 4-5. The
federal government and many other states have statutes very similar to Section 113.2 The
district court applied Section 113 consistently with the application by the federal
government, as well as with the application by all other states with statutes similar to
Section 113, by upholding the majority of See's deductions because under an arm's
length transaction analysis they were on par with royalty payments between by unrelated
third parties entering similar transactions.

In 1997, Columbia Insurance Company ("Columbia") offered to purchase IP from See's
(and other Berkshire subsidiaries) in exchange for stock. See's Candies, Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, Case No. 140401556, Utah Fourth Judicial District Court,
October 6, 2016 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("District
Court Decision") at ,r 4. See's accepted the offer and, pursuant to a transfer pricing study,
the value of the IP was assessed at about $450 million and was then exchanged for the
equivalent value in preferred stock. Id. See's then licensed the intellectual property from
Columbia in exchange for a royalty fee. Id. at ,i,r 4-5. See's has deducted the royalty fees
as an ordinary and necessary business expense on its Utah corporation franchise tax
returns. Id. at 123.
1

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 482; AZ Code § 43-942; CO Code § 39-22-303(6); DC Code §
47-1810.03; GA Code§ 48-7-35; KS§ 79-32,141; LA Code§ 47:95(A); MS Code§ 27737(2)(c); MO Code§ 148.040(4); MT Code§ 15-31-141(5); ND Code§ 57-3.4-03; NY
CLS Code § 605; OH Code § 5733.03 l{B); OK Code § 2366; OR Code § 314.295; WV
Code§ 11-24-13a(f); WI Code§ 71.30(2).
2

2

The Commission is now asking this Court to overturn this ruling of the district
court, and to create a situation in Utah where-even though the taxpayer complies with
all specific tax statutes expressly passed by the Legislature-the Commission would
nevertheless have unbridled authority under Section 113 to recalculate a taxpayer's
income any time a transaction between related taxpayers decreases income regardless of
whether the transaction is on par with similar transactions of unrelated parties.
The UTA is aware of no case or situation at the federal level, or in any other state,
where an executive branch of government is given authority to do what the Commission
is requesting in this case - to reject in its entirety an expense paid to a related party
simply because it has the effect of reducing income regardless of whether a similar
transaction would have been entered by unrelated parties. As a result, if this Court were
to adopt the Commission's position, Utah would become the only taxing authority (state
or federal) to grant the executive branch unfettered discretion to deny lawful deductions
simply because the deductions reduce taxable income.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 113 WOULD
UNDERMINE UTAH'S STABLE AND PREDICTABLE RULE OF LAW
AND THE RESULTING FAVORABLE BUSINESS CLIMATE.
The issue before this Court is whether the Commission has unfettered discretion

under Section 113 to re-characterize valid business deductions between related entities
anytime income decreases due to the deductions. The UTA agrees that the district court
applied reasonable and longstanding standards for applying Section 113-type statutes,
finding that the transaction between See's and Columbia had a valid business purpose,
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and was consistent with transactions among unrelated parties. See District Court
Decision at p. 34. The district court's approach rather than the Commission's approach
will promote consistency and predictability for the taxpayers of Utah, thereby ensuring a
more robust investment climate and economy for the State of Utah.

A.

There are no instances of any government entity denying a deduction
in toto using Section 113-type statutes as the Commission attempts to
do here.

Importantly, the Commission's approach is not supported by any case precedent or
other federal or state approaches. The UTA is not aware of the federal government or
other state that has allowed the executive branch discretion to deny in toto valid
deductions with business purpose on the sole basis that the deduction has reduced taxable
income. Further and despite the fact that Section 113 and its predecessor law have been
part of Utah's code since 1931, the Commission specifically admits "there are no state
court decisions where a similar deduction was disallowed in its entirety under similar
facts." District Court Decision, 40. Further, the Commission previously permitted See's
exact transaction under the related party standard. In its prior audit of See's in 1998, the
Commission approved the exact same deduction on the exact same terms as the district
court approved in the instant case. District Court Decision at, 29. Now, the
Commission is proposing that it be given authority never previously claimed or
exercised, in contradiction to the position the Commission took in its prior audit of the
very transactions in question.

4

B.

The Commission claims unfettered discretion in applying Section 113.

In a complete change of opinion from its 1998 audit, the Commission now argues
before this Court that the standards upheld by the district court should not be applied and
that the arm's length pricing of a transaction should not even be reviewed. Tax
Commission's May 1, 201 7 Brief ("Commission Brief') at pp. 10-11. Rather the
Commission claims it should have authority to deny a deduction any time income is
reduced in a transaction between related entities. Id.at 30-31.
This about-face by the Commission is of grave concern to the UTA. The
following statements by the Commission reflect its assertion that Section 113 gives it the
right to deny a lawful deduction simply because the deduction "reduce[s] ... taxable
income":
The See's/Columbia intercompany transactions have distorted See's income
because, although See's business has not changed-it continues to sell candy in
Utah under the See's tradename-the transactions reduced See's taxable Utah
income by approximately 82% each of the subject tax years.

See Id. at p. 10 (emphasis added) .
. . . the Commission can distribute, apportion, or allocate income or deductions
between related companies where doing so is necessary to ... clearly show such a
corporation's income. Here, [the See's transaction] purported to reduce See's
taxable Utah income by approximately 82% each year. Thus, the Commission
appropriately implemented Section 113 when it reallocated See's deductions for
royalty payments to Columbia as income to See's.

Id. at pp. 30-31 (emphasis added).
The Commission's interpretation would allow it to "reallocate[] as income" any
deductions that "reduce ... taxable Utah income;" in other words-all deductions
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between related parties are now at risk of being "reallocated as income" because, by
definition and function, all deductions reduce income.

C.

A standard is necessary to guide the application of the Commission's
discretion under Section 113 and to safeguard Utah's taxpayers.

The only way to properly apply Section 113 is through employing a standard.3
The district court correctly concluded that the proper standard for applying Section 113type statutes is to put related taxpayers on par with unrelated taxpayers. District Court
Decision at p. 34. This approach will promote consistency and predictability for
taxpayers in our state. This standard has been uniformly applied for decades by the
federal government and by states with Section 113-type statutes. See, e.g., Commissioner

v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394,400, 92 S. Ct. 1085, 1089-1090 (1972) ("'[t]he purpose
of section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled
taxpayer .... The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer
dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer"') (quoting 26 CFR § 1.4821(b )(1) (1971), and noting that "[t]he first regulations interpreting this section of the
statute were issued in 1934 [and] [t]hey have remained virtually unchanged"); Kellogg

Co. v. Olson, 675 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tenn. 1984) (interpreting a Section 113-type state

3

In Continental Telephone Co. of Utah v. State Tax Comm 'n, 539 P.2d 447 (Utah 1975),

this Court "did not find unbridled equitable power in the Tax Commission to reallocate
income between parties under section 59-7-113." District Court Decision at p. 24. The
Continental Court looked outside of Section 113 's predecessor statute to determine the
meaning of federal "taxes paid" in order to decide whether reallocation of income under
Section 113 was appropriate. Id. Even though partial reallocation was allowed in that
case, it was not because the Commission had unfettered discretion, but because the Court
concluded that a portion of the deductions claimed for "federal tax payments" were not
actual payments of federal taxes. See id
6

statute by looking to I.RC. § 482 and stating "[t]he purpose of§ 482 is 'to prevent the
arbitrary shifting of income and deductions among controlled corporations and to place
such corporations on a 'tax parity' with uncontrolled corporations") (quoting Young &
Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233, 1244 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ((citing Treas. Reg.§

1.482-1(1962))). This Court should ensure that this long-standing and reasonable
standard remains the rule of law in Utah (and as applied by the Commission itself in its
1998 audit of the same transaction) by upholding the district court decision. Businesses
thrive in a predictable legal environment and the district court's interpretation of current
law is predictable and consistent. To maintain such an environment in Utah, the UTA
encourages this Court to affirm the district court's application of a predictable standard
for applying Section 113.
Unfortunately, the Commission flatly refuses to offer a standard by which it or
other adjudicatory bodies can determine whether claiming a deduction is tax evasion or
does not reflect the taxpayer's income as required by Section 113, see Commission Brief
at p. 10. The Commission's argument that Section 113 itself provides a sufficient
standard is unavailing and leaves Utah taxpayers economically vulnerable. The
Commission claims that its interpretation of Section 113 limits its authority because
reallocation can only take place in a "very narrow set of circumstances." Commission
Brief, p. 12. According to the Commission, the "very narrow set of circumstances" are
that parties to the transactions must be related and the Commission must conclude that
reallocation "is necessary either (1) to prevent evasion of taxes or (2) to clearly reflect the
income of any such corporation." Id. But the Commission then goes on to suggest that it
7

has authority to find '~tax evasion" or a distortion of income any time a lawful deduction
between related parties reduces taxable income, id. at p. 10, and pp. 30-31, which is
functionally no limitation at all. According to the Commission, it is enough that the
deduction reduces taxable income and works some form of"distort[ion]" to income. See

id at p. 10.
Thus, the test supplied by the Commission - essentially a regurgitation of Section
113 - is meaningless without a further standard. This is further evidenced by the fact that
the federal government and other states with legislation similar to Section 113 have
adopted the "arm's length transaction" test to ensure consistent implementation and
fairness and overcome the patent vagueness of the statute.
Even if the Commission has the present intention to exercise restraint in deciding
whether to reallocate deductions, the interpretation advocated by the Commission lacks a
standard for future application and thus does not demand any restraint by future
Commissions. This absence of a standard would cede too much taxation authority to
unelected tax auditors, and would introduce significant uncertainty into Utah's business
climate. Such an approach would discourage businesses from coming to Utah or
expanding their current operations here.

D.

The Commission's interpretations of "tax evasion" and "clearly
reflect" from Section 113 are alarming for taxpayers, but should be
viewed as limited by legislative enactments and restraints on the
Commission.

The Commission declares that tax '"evasion' [is] akin to [tax] avoidance" and
does not require "doing something illegal." Commission Brief, p. 16. Under the
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Commission's expansive definition of "tax evasion," law-abiding related taxpayers could
be labeled tax evaders by the Commission any time they legally deduct payments to
related entities. The district court aptly characterized the Commission's position as
asserting the "discretion to redistribute the deduction under section 59-7-113 to ensure
maximum taxation by nullifying anything that reduces income." District Court Decision
at p. 30 (emphasis added). 4
The Commission also argues that the right to reallocate deductions to "clearly
reflect" a taxpayer's income allows it to reallocate a legal deduction for the sole reason
that the deduction reduces taxable income. The Commission reallocated See's
deductions for its royalty payments to Columbia in order to "restore[] See's income to the
same basis on which it was calculated before its intercompany property sale."
Commission Brief, p. 18. The Commission did not and has not challenged the legal basis
for the sale of intellectual property to Columbia or the deductions claimed by See's, yet it
argues that the deduction distorts See's income solely because it reduces taxable income.
Id. at pp. 16-18. The fact that reallocation of a deduction increases taxable income is not

proof that the deductions were not lawful or that the taxpayer's income is not "clearly
reflected." Any deduction, lawful or not, will always reduce taxable income. The denial

In its order, the district court quoted the argument from the Commission's counsel as
follows: "Our ... argument is the simple fact that it reduces their tax by 82 percent So
... whether or not this is similar to what someone else would do ... between unrelated
parties, whether or not it's arm's-length ... is not an element that is ... required by the
statute.... Our reliance is pretty much on the language of the statute that says ... if it's
between related parties ... what happens between unrelated parties is really not relevant
to that." District Court Decision at p. 30 (ellipses in tax court's order).

4

9

of a deduction, lawful or not, will always result in an increase in taxable income. Thus,
the outcome of an increase in taxable income due to a denial of a lawful deduction does
not prove the legality of the Commission's actions any more than the Commission
imposing a penalty proves guilt.
The UTA asserts that despite the Commission's contention for unfettered
discretion in applying Section 113, the "Tax Commission, while created by constitutional
mandate, is limited in its power and scope by the legislature." Blaine Hudson Printing v.
Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 870 P .2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Mack v. Utah
State Dep't of Commerce, Div. ofSec., 2009 UT 47, ,I 33,221 P.3d 194 ("District courts
have general jurisdiction, which provides them with broad adjudicative authority....
Agencies, in contrast, are limited to the adjudicative authority granted by the
legislature.") (internal citations omitted). The Commission's claim of such broad
discretion under Section 113 ignores these important limits on its authority and would
allow it the unprecedented right to "ensure maximum taxation by nullifying anything that
reduces income." District Court Decision at p. 30. If the election of a taxpayer to take a
deduction meets the reasonable standard found by the District Court, any further
discretion by the Commissions is vitiated.
Again, the Commission did not and has not challenged the legal basis for the sale
of intellectual property to Columbia or the deductions claimed by _See's. lt simply argues
that using a deduction distorts See's income because it reduces taxable income. However
and importantly, the Utah Legislature has expressly authorized numerous tax deductions,
credits and exemptions in the Utah Code. Moreover, this Court has long upheld the right
10

of "the already overburdened taxpayer" to use "legally sanctioned ingenuity conceived in
order to effectuate a tax saving." Budget Homes v. State Tax Comm'n, 120 Utah 425,429

(Utah 1951 ).
Taxpayers routinely make substantial capital investments that result in income tax
losses for a few years, with the expectation that these investments will produce profits in
the future. Such business judgments of taxpayers are commonplace and should not be
questioned by taxing authorities, even though income is decreased in a given tax year. So
long as a deduction is legally permissible and, in the case of related entities, in an amount
consistent with transactions among unrelated parties, the Commission's authority should
not be extended to disallow valid deductions. Related taxpayers in Utah enter business
transactions every day, and they should not be concerned that those transactions could be
"'undone" at the whim of a tax auditor, especially when the taxpayer has paid meticulous
attention to ensure that the pricing is at fair value such as See's did with its Deloitte
study. R. 502;

II.

F.,

7.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT DISREGARD THE LEGISLATURE'S
SPECIFIC TAXING SCHEME OR POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
INTEREST OF GENERATING MORE TAX REVENUE. THAT IS THE
SOLE PROVINCE OF THE LEGISLATURE.
The Commission should not be allowed to deny deductions for lawful payments to

related entities simply because legislatively enacted statutes result in a tax outcome with
which someone in the executive branch does not agree. By statute, the Utah Legislature
has determined that insurance companies pay taxes based on premiums collected through
a premiums tax rather than paying an income tax. See Utah Code Ann.§ 59-7-102(1)
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(1999) ("the following are exempt from this chapter: ... (c) insurance companies which
are otherwise taxed on their premiums under Title 59, Chapter 9, Taxation of Admitted
Insurers"); see also 2017 Utah House Journal at p. 1827; 2017 Utah Senate Journal at p.
1468 (stating intent language for House Bill 42 (2017)). In passing House Bill 42, which
clarified how insurance companies should be taxed, the House and Senate both voted to
include the following intent language in the House and Senate Journal: "The philosophy
in taxation of insurance companies has been that it is better for the state to exact the
support for exercising a corporate business charter by taxing insurance premiums in lieu
of taxing net income. In adopting such a philosophy, Utah, like most states, has made it
clear that if an insurance company is subject to a premium tax then the net income of
such company is not subject to the corporate income or franchise tax. This bill makes it
clear that is, has been and will continue to be the philosophy of Utah." Id. These policy
decisions were made by elected representatives in an open legislative process. The fact
that, in a particular fact situation, a transaction with an insurance company results in the
payment of less income tax than someone in the executive branch would like is not a
basis under I.R.C. § 482, Utah's Section l 13 or any other similar statute to disregard the
transaction.

In ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2003 UT 53 ,I 22, 86 P.3d 706,
711, the Utah Supreme Court held that "any concerns we have with the reduction of
revenue are not properly assuaged by an ends-based statutory interpretation." The Utah
Legislature has chosen to tax insurance companies through premiums rather than income,

12

and the Commission is not authorized to deprive taxpayers of the income tax deductions
permitted by these taxation statutes.
The current favorable business climate in Utah is the result of carefully thought
out policies and rules of law established by the Legislature. Where, as here, the
Commission claims the right to deny legitimate, legislatively authorized deductions
simply because they reduce tax revenue, this Court should do as the district court
correctly did and preserve separation of powers by preserving the right of the Legislature
to establish the taxation rule of law for this state.

CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Commission's interpretation of Section 113 would be detrimental
to Utah's business economy. This broad, aggressive posture of the executive branch
would create an unfavorable, even threatening, tax climate in Utah. Such a posture
would undermine the stable and predictable Utah business climate and economy putting
Utah on an island as the only U.S. taxing authority to leave related taxpayers exposed to
the whims of tax auditors, with no checks or balances. Where, as in this case as found by
the district court, the tax deduction is ordinary and necessary, has business purpose; and,
if between related parties, is equivalent to a transaction between unrelated parties-the
executive branch has no authority to substitute its own business judgment for that of the
taxpayer. See District Court Decision at p. 34. For the reasons set forth above, the UTA
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision.
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